Yu Zhou

More than 10 days later, there is little consensus of UN climate change conference at Copenhagen beyond the fact the conference was badly organized and chaotic.  We have heard conflicting perceptions and interpretations, which is not unusual.  Yet a picture has emerged in the Western media that the Chinese delegation bullied and managed to sabotage the conference for a global treaty.  In particular, an article from the Guardian newspaper by Mark Lynas offers the most direct first person account on this line of the story.  The article has been picked up around the world in English media (NPR, Times Magazine, to name a few).  It not only serves as the standard narrative of Chinese delegation behavior, but is also seen as indication of a worrying style of arrogance and self-centeredness of China as a new superpower.   Yet, what is troubling is that this account refers to absolutely nothing from China’s own explanation beyond offering its own assertions of China’s intentions, in addition to other developing countries.   On Dec. 25, Xinhua released its own account about the experiences of the Chinese delegation (English translation). Comparing the two, the conflicts are rather revealing.  Without adopting the conclusion or sentiment of either account, this post relies on details offered in both.

I do not doubt the accuracy or authenticity of Mark Lynas’ story.  But what bothers me is the part left out of his article and the logics of in his conclusion.  I would quote Lynas’ article liberally.

The article made the opening claim on China’s Copenhagen strategy: “China’s strategy was simple: block the open negotiations for two weeks, and then ensure that the closed-door deal made it look as if the west had failed the world’s poor once again.”

By way of evidence, it offers that “Sudan behaves at the talks as a puppet of China; one of a number of countries that relieves the Chinese delegation of having to fight its battles in open sessions. It was a perfect stitch-up. China gutted the deal behind the scenes, and then left its proxies to savage it in public.”

These Chinese “proxies” refer to Sudan, Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela.  It is not a secret that these countries have anti-Western attitudes and have never hesitated to voice their opinions at any UN forums they had access to.   Why would Lynas’ presume that that if one country voices its anti-western sentiment, it automatically acts as China’s proxy and works for China’s strategies. Does he agree with the Bush doctrine that “you are either with us or against us.”  It is disheartening to see environmentalists adopt such a line of reasoning.

Then, Lynas offers his personal eyewitness account.

“Here’s what actually went on late last Friday night, as heads of state from two dozen countries met behind closed doors. Obama was at the table for several hours, sitting between Gordon Brown and the Ethiopian prime minister, Meles Zenawi. The Danish prime minister chaired, and on his right sat Ban Ki-moon, secretary-general of the UN. Probably only about 50 or 60 people, including the heads of state, were in the room. I was attached to one of the delegations, whose head of state was also present for most of the time.

What I saw was profoundly shocking. The Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, did not deign to attend the meetings personally, instead sending a second-tier official in the country’s foreign ministry to sit opposite Obama himself. The diplomatic snub was obvious and brutal, as was the practical implication: several times during the session, the world’s most powerful heads of state were forced to wait around as the Chinese delegate went off to make telephone calls to his “superiors”.”

First of all, Lynas did not tell us what this group of heads of the state was. In what capacity were they negotiating a close-door global deal? Who selected the countries to be at the table? What criteria were used?  According to the Western press, there were two meetings that Premier Wen allegedly skipped.  It is not clear at which one Lynas was present.  If there were a total of 50-60 people, it could not be more than 20-30 countries present.  The Xinhua account said that Chinese Premier Wen was astonished to hear about this (or an earlier) meeting from another foreign leader without being informed from the conference organizers.  One can understand the desperation of the conference organizers to some smaller assemblies to work out a deal.  But given how high a stake such a treaty would be to any country, ad hoc arrangements without consultation with would-be participants would be a disaster. Wen’s objection to have a small group of countries to negotiate a close door global deal was not that surprising, given China was not involved in the selecting process.  In fact, Copenhagen conference had been plagued by various versions of draft negotiated in exclusive circles from the very beginning.  Chinese reactions to these meetings did not seem to be groundless.  In the end, Chinese decided to send a second-tier official.

One may argue that the final Copenhagen accord also emerged from a selected group of countries between USA and China, India, South Africa and Brazil.  But there are major differences.  The final accord was not a legally binding treaty, and with the exception of Obama who was interested to reach a global accord, the rest of the heads of state went to the meeting to coordinate their stands as a group, rather than drafting a deal for the world.  In contrast, according to Lynas, the meeting he was present was intend to reach a global deal.

“I am certain that had the Chinese not been in the room, we would have left Copenhagen with a deal that had environmentalists popping champagne corks popping in every corner of the world.”

Lynas further describes the behavior of Chinese representative at the meeting

“To those who would blame Obama and rich countries in general, know this: it was China’s representative who insisted that industrialized country targets, previously agreed as an 80% cut by 2050, be taken out of the deal. “Why can’t we even mention our own targets?” demanded a furious Angela Merkel. Australia’s prime minister, Kevin Rudd, was annoyed enough to bang his microphone. Brazil’s representative too pointed out the illogicality of China’s position. Why should rich countries not announce even this unilateral cut? The Chinese delegate said no, and I watched, aghast, as Merkel threw up her hands in despair and conceded the point. Now we know why – because China bet, correctly, that Obama would get the blame for the Copenhagen accord’s lack of ambition.”

Here Chinese delegate came across as truly rude and unreasonable.  But wait, is he saying that EU countries need China’s approval for a unilateral target?  Do we miss anything here? Lynas explains that China blocks this target so that China could shift blame to Obama?  But everyone had already known before the Copenhagen conference that Obama’s hands were tied by the difficulty of the US Senate to pass major promises on the climate bill.   How could an act by China blocking a deal shift more blame to Obama?  Wouldn’t it simply shift blame to China?  Lynas’ logic makes no sense. 

Lynas offer further explanation or speculation, and habitually without consulting any Chinese long standing positions.

“All this raises the question: what is China’s game? Why did China, in the words of a UK-based analyst who also spent hours in heads of state meetings, ‘not only reject targets for itself, but also refuse to allow any other country to take on binding targets?’ The analyst, who has attended climate conferences for more than 15 years, concludes that China wants to weaken the climate regulation regime now ‘in order to avoid the risk that it might be called on to be more ambitious in a few years’ time’.”

There is no doubt that China and other developing countries do not want to submit to a binding target on their total emission.  Yet what is truly strange is that the article grants China the ultimate power to stop any country from issuing its own target reduction.  What right does China have to stop the UK or any other EU country from unilaterally cutting 50% of its own emissions?  This is especially weird since China made its own unilateral target and announced that it won’t link the target with any other country.  Are these so called unilateral cuts from the EU in fact linked with some conditions that Lynas did not tell us? The Chinese representative in Lynas’ article appeared only capable of saying no, and no explanations were offered.

Even if the Chinese representative said anything, it is unclear that Lynas would hear them.  Here is what Lynas said about Indians.

“The Indians, in particular, have become past masters at co-opting the language of equity (”equal rights to the atmosphere”) in the service of planetary suicide – and leftish campaigners and commentators are hoist with their own petard.”

For Lynas, India’s concern for equality has no legitimacy.  He also seems to suggest no one but the West cares for the planetary suicide:  “Obama needed a strong deal perhaps more than anyone. The US had confirmed the offer of $100bn to developing countries for adaptation, put serious cuts on the table for the first time (17% below 2005 levels by 2020), and was obviously prepared to up its offer.”  Lynas probably was among the very few participants in Copenhagen who were convinced about the all-out effort to stop the climate change by the USA.

These are just some of the holes in this article. Yet as it is making its rounds on the internet, it invents and fortifies an unreasonable, rude, uncaring and hegemonic China in contrast to a self-less and vigilant West working for the global welfare.  

Xinhua’s account of Copenhagen depicts Wen as the hero in the conference.  Yet, it is not clear that Wen was committed to some global of deal either.  But there are some interesting details missing from the western reporting.  Beyond the fact that Wen was not informed by the conference organizer about the meeting with selected heads of the state, we also learn that Wen went to a scheduled UN speaking forum only to find that no one was there until an hour and a half later, underlining the chaotic nature of the conference.  The Western press speculated that Wen was furious at Obama since Obama implicitly criticized China in his opening speech, which prompted Wen to skip two meetings of the heads of states.  Yet Wen held a private meeting with Obama right after Obama’s speech for which all sides reported good results.  In the dramatic scene where Obama crashed into the meeting Wen held with the India, South Africa and Brazil heads of state, American press reported only that Obama busted into the meeting, but Xinhua reported Obama asked Wen who was chairing the meeting whether he could come in or waited for the scheduled individual meeting with Wen.  Wen invited him to join the group.  This suggests that Wen had the option to meet with Obama individually but chose not to exercise it, undermining a sense of a major confrontation between US and China.  Lynas also claims that China cared nothing about the fate of small island nations, but we learned from Xinhua that Wen met with the representatives from island nations for over two hours to listen to their concerns, something Obama did not do.  What emerged from these details was quite a different China from the one portrayed in Lynas article, even one could not fully trust Xinhua’s account.

Conflicting interpretations of such a chaotic conference is unavoidable, in addition to different positions held by people from different ends.  But what is dangerous is the tendency to make grand statements while completely ignore the other side of argument, in other words, delegitimizing any other positions by totally ignoring their own explanations.  If the West and China want to deal with each other with any measure of success, the good place to start is at least trying to listen to other side of the story before jumping to conclusions. 

Yu ZHOU is a Professor of Geography at Vassar College. She is the author of “Inside story of China’s high-tech industry: Making Silicon Valley in Beijing.”